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Abstract:
Algorithmic trading has sharply increased over the past decade. Equity market liquidity has 
improved as well. Are the two trends related? For a recent five-year panel of New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) stocks, we use a normalized measure of electronic message traffic (order 
submissions, cancellations, and executions) as a proxy for algorithmic trading, and we trace 
the associations between liquidity and message traffic. Based on within-stock variation, we 
find that algorithmic trading and liquidity are positively related. To sort out causality, we use 
the start of autoquoting on the NYSE as an exogenous instrument for algorithmic trading. 
Previously, specialists were responsible for manually disseminating the inside quote. As 
stocks were phased in gradually during early 2003, the manual quote was replaced by a new 
automated quote whenever there was a change to the NYSE limit order book. This market 
structure change provides quicker feedback to traders and algorithms and results in more 
message traffic. For large-cap stocks in particular, quoted and effective spreads narrow under 
autoquote and adverse selection declines, indicating that algorithmic trading does causally 
improve liquidity. 
JEL Classification: G10 
Keywords: Liquidity, Algorithmic Trading, Microstructure. Technological change has revolutionized the way ﬁnancial assets are traded. Back oﬃce improve-
ments can support vastly increased trading volume. Retail investors place orders via computer
rather than speaking to a broker on the phone. Trading ﬂoors have largely been replaced by
electronic trading platforms (Jain (2005)).
The nature of order execution has changed dramatically as well, as many market partici-
pants now employ algorithmic trading (AT), commonly deﬁned as the use of computer algorithms
to manage the trading process. From a starting point near zero about ten years ago, AT is now
thought to be responsible for 1
3 of trading volume in the U.S and is expected to account for perhaps
half of trading volume by 2010.1 The intense activity generated by algorithms threatens to over-
whelm exchanges and market data providers,2 forcing signiﬁcant upgrades to their infrastructures.
Before algorithmic trading took hold, a pension fund manager who wanted to buy 30,000
shares of IBM might hire a broker-dealer to search for a counterparty to execute the entire quantity
at once in a block trade. Alternatively, that institutional investor might have hired a New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) ﬂoor broker to go stand at the IBM post and quietly “work” the order, us-
ing his judgment and discretion to buy a little bit here and there over the course of the trading day
to keep from driving the IBM share price up too far. As trading became more electronic, it became
easier and cheaper to replicate that ﬂoor trader with a computer program doing algorithmic trading
(see Hendershott and Moulton (2007) for evidence on the decline in NYSE ﬂoor broker activity).
Now virtually every large broker-dealer oﬀers a suite of algorithms to its institutional customers to
help them execute orders in a single stock, in pairs of stocks, or in baskets of stocks. Algorithms
typically determine the timing, price, and quantity of orders, dynamically monitoring market con-
ditions across diﬀerent securities and trading venues, reducing market impact by optimally (and
sometimes randomly) breaking large orders into smaller pieces, and closely tracking benchmarks
such as the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) over the execution interval. As they pursue a
desired position, these algorithms often use a mix of active and passive strategies, employing both
limit orders and marketable orders. Thus, at times they function as liquidity demanders, and at
times these algorithms supply liquidity.
Many observers think of algorithms from the standpoint of this institutional buy-side
investor.3 But there are other important users of algorithms. Some hedge funds and broker-dealers
supply liquidity using algorithms, competing with designated market-makers and other liquidity
suppliers. For assets that trade on multiple venues, liquidity demanders often use smart order
routers to determine where to send a marketable order. All of these are also forms of algorithmic
trading.4
1See “Ahead of the Tape-Algorithmic Trading,” Economist, June 23, 2007.
2See “Dodgy Tickers-Stock Exchanges,” Economist, March 10, 2007.
3See, for example, Domowitz and Yegerman (2005).
4Algorithms can also be used to formulate trading decisions and strategies as well as implement them. There are
clearly feedback eﬀects between the portfolio strategy side and the execution side. For example, algorithmic execution
could be the diﬀerence in making a trading-intensive algorithmic portfolio strategy feasible. Our data reﬂect counts
1As AT has grown rapidly over the past ten years or so, liquidity in world equity markets
has also dramatically improved. Based on these two coincident trends, it is tempting to conclude
that algorithmic trading is at least partially responsible. But it is not at all obvious ap r i o r ithat
AT and liquidity should be positively related. If algorithms are cheaper and/or better at supplying
liquidity, then AT may result in more competition in liquidity provision, thereby lowering the cost
of immediacy. However, the eﬀects could go the other way if algorithms are used mainly to demand
liquidity. Limit order submitters grant a trading option to others, and if algorithms make liquidity
demanders better able to identify and pick oﬀ an in-the-money trading option, then the cost of
providing the trading option increases, and spreads must widen to compensate. In fact, AT could
actually lead to an unproductive arms race, where liquidity suppliers and liquidity demanders both
invest in better algorithms to try to take advantage of the other side, with measured liquidity the
unintended victim.
In this paper, we attempt to gauge empirically the relationship between algorithmic trading
and liquidity. We use a normalized measure of NYSE electronic message traﬃc as a proxy for
algorithmic trading. This message traﬃc includes electronic order submissions, cancellations, and
trade reports. Because we normalize by trading volume, variation in our AT measure is for the most
part driven by variation in limit order submissions and cancellations. This means that our measure
is mainly picking up variation in algorithmic liquidity supply. This liquidity supply is likely coming
both from proprietary traders making markets algorithmically and from buy-side institutions that
are submitting limit orders as part of “slice and dice” algorithms.
AT’s eﬀect on liquidity is assessed using two empirical approaches. First, panel regressions
are used to establish that time-series increases in algorithmic trading are associated with more
liquid markets. While AT and liquidity move in the same direction during our sample period, it
is certainly possible that the relationship is not causal. Thus, the panel regressions are mostly a
warmup for the main part of the paper, where we study an important exogenous event that increases
the amount of algorithmic trading in some stocks but not others. To establish causality, we use the
start of autoquoting on the NYSE as an exogenous instrument for algorithmic trading. Previously,
specialists were responsible for manually disseminating the inside quote. This was replaced in early
2003 by a new automated quote whenever there was a change to the NYSE limit order book. This
market structure change provides quicker feedback to traders and algorithms and results in more
electronic message traﬃc. The change was also phased in for diﬀerent stocks at diﬀerent times,
and we take advantage of this non-synchronicity to cleanly identify the eﬀects.
We ﬁnd that algorithmic trading does in fact improve liquidity for large-cap stocks. Quoted
and eﬀective spreads narrow under autoquote. The narrower spreads are a result of a sharp decline
in adverse selection, or equivalently a decrease in the amount of price discovery associated with
trades. There are no signiﬁcant eﬀects for smaller-cap stocks, but our instrument is weaker there,
of actual orders submitted and canceled, so we focus on the execution side of algorithms.
2so the problem may be a lack of statistical power.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that algorithmic trading increases realized spreads and other mea-
sures of liquidity supplier revenues. This is surprising because we initially expected that if AT
improved liquidity, the mechanism would be competition between liquidity providers. However,
the evidence clearly indicates that liquidity suppliers are capturing some of the surplus for them-
selves. To help make sense of this counter-intuitive result, we introduce the generalized Roll model
developed in Hasbrouck (2007), modiﬁed to allow algorithmic liquidity supply. The model matches
up with all our empirical ﬁndings. In particular, it shows that liquidity supplier revenues depend
on the degree of competition between the marginal liquidity suppliers. To put it starkly, in a world
without algorithms, liquidity supplier revenues depend on the degree of competition between liquid-
ity supplier humans. In a world with algorithms, liquidity supplier revenues depend on the degree
of competition between algorithms. Our results suggest that, at least immediately following the
start of autoquote, there could have been less competition between the best algorithms, perhaps
because new algorithms require considerable investment and time-to-build.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses related literature. Section 2 describes
our data and analyzes algorithmic trading and its impact from 2001 through 2005. Section 3 exam-
ines algorithmic trading and liquidity surrounding the NYSE’s staggered introduction of autoquote
in 2003. Section 4 discusses and interprets the results, and Section 5 concludes.
1 Related literature
There are very few academic papers that address algorithmic trading directly, and none that tackle
the broader eﬀects of algorithmic trading on overall market quality. For example, Engle, Russell,
and Ferstenberg (2007) use execution data from Morgan Stanley algorithms to study the tradeoﬀs
between algorithm aggressiveness and the mean and dispersion of execution cost. Domowitz and
Yegerman (2005) study execution costs of ITG buy-side clients, comparing results from diﬀerent
algorithm providers.
However, there are several strands of academic literature that touch related topics. Most
models take the traditional view that one set of traders provides liquidity via quotes or limit orders
and another set of traders initiates a trade to take that liquidity – for either informational or
liquidity/hedging reasons. Many assume that liquidity suppliers are perfectly competitive, e.g.,
Glosten (1994). Glosten (1989) models a monopolistic liquidity supplier, while Biais, Martimort,
and Rochet (2000) allow for an arbitrary number of symmetric competing liquidity suppliers and
ﬁnd that liquidity suppliers’ rents decline as the number increases. Our initial expectation is that
AT facilitate the entry of additional liquidity suppliers, and reduce their overall rents.
3The development and adoption of AT also involves strategic considerations. While algo-
rithms have low marginal costs, there may be substantial development costs, and it may be costly
to optimize the algorithms’ parameters for each security. The need to recover these costs should
lead to the adoption of algorithmic trading at times and in securities where the returns to adoption
are highest (see Reinganum (1989) for a review of innovation and technology adoption).
As discussed brieﬂy in the introduction, liquidity supply involves posting ﬁrm commit-
ments to trade. These standing orders provide free trading options to other traders. Using stan-
dard option pricing techniques, Copeland and Galai (1983) value the cost of the option granted by
liquidity suppliers. The arrival of public information renders existing orders stale and can move
the trading option into the money. Foucault, Ro¨ ell, and Sandas (2003) study the equilibrium level
of eﬀort that liquidity suppliers should expend in monitoring the market to avoid this risk. Black
(1995) proposes to minimize picking-oﬀ risk with a new limit order type that is indexed to the over-
all market. Algorithms enable this kind of monitoring and adjustment of limit orders in response
to public information. In fact, in recent work, Rosu (2006) develops a model that implicitly recog-
nizes these technological advances and simply assumes limit orders can be constantly adjusted. In
general, if AT reduces the cost of the free trading option implicit in limit orders, then measures of
adverse selection should decrease with AT. If some users of AT are better at avoiding being picked
oﬀ, they can impose adverse selection costs on other liquidity suppliers (similar to the mechanism
in Rock (1990)) and even drive other liquidity suppliers out.
AT may also be used by traders who are trying to passively accumulate or liquidate a large
position. There are a few papers that derive optimal dynamic execution strategies for such traders.
For example, Bertsimas and Lo (1998) ﬁnd that, in the presence of temporary price impacts and
conditional on completing the entire transaction by a ﬁxed date, orders are optimally broken into
pieces so as to minimize cost. Almgren and Chriss (2000) extend this by considering the risk that
arises from breaking up orders and slowly executing them. Obizhaeva and Wang (2005) optimize
assuming that liquidity does not replenish immediately after it is taken but only gradually over
time. Many brokers build models with such considerations into their AT products that they sell to
their clients. On the empirical side, Keim and Madhavan (1995) provide evidence that large orders
are broken up, and Chan and Lakonishok (1995) study institutional orders that are worked over
multiple days.
For each component of the larger transaction, a trader (or algorithm) must choose the
type and aggressiveness of the order. Cohen et al. (1981) and Harris (1998) focus on the simplest
static choice: market order versus limit order. If a trader chooses a non-marketable limit order,
the aggressiveness of the order is determined by its limit price (Griﬃths et al. (2000) and Ranaldo
(2004)). Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (2002) ﬁnd that execution times are very sensitive to the choice
of limit price. If limit orders do not execute, traders can cancel them and resubmit them with more
aggressive prices. A short time between submission and cancellation suggests the presence of AT,
4and in fact Hasbrouck and Saar (2007) ﬁnd that a large number of limit orders are cancelled within
two seconds on the Inet trading platform (which is now Nasdaq’s trading mechanism).
2 Data and full sample analysis
To study the relationship between algorithmic trading and liquidity, we start with a monthly panel
of NYSE common stocks. We limit ourselves to the post-decimalization regime because the change
to a one penny minimum tick was a structural break that substantially altered the entire trading
landscape, including liquidity metrics and order submission strategies. The sample extends for
almost ﬁve years, beginning in February 2001 and ending in December 2005. We start with a
sample of all NYSE common stocks that can be matched across the NYSE’s Trade and Quotes
(TAQ) and the CRSP databases and retain the stocks that are present throughout the whole
sample period (in order to maintain a balanced panel). Stocks with an average share price of less
than $5 are removed from the sample, as are stocks with an average share price of more than $1,000.
The resulting sample comprises 943 common stocks.
Stocks are sorted into quintiles based on market capitalization. Quintile 1 refers to large-
cap stocks and quintile 5 corresponds to small-cap stocks. All variables used in the analysis are
99.9% winsorized (that is, values smaller than the 0.05% quantile are set equal to that quantile,
and values larger than the 99.95% quantile are set equal to that quantile).
2.1 Proxies for algorithmic trading
We cannot directly observe whether a particular order is generated by a computer algorithm. For
cost and speed reasons, most algorithms do not rely on human intermediaries but instead generate
orders that are sent electronically to a trading venue. Thus, the rate of electronic message traﬃc can
be used as a proxy for the amount of algorithmic trading taking place. This proxy is commonly used
by market participants, including consultants Aite Group and Tabb Group, as well as exchanges
and other market venues.5
For example, in discussing market venue capacity limits following an episode of heavy
trading volume in February 2007, a Securities Industry News report quotes Nasdaq SVP of Nasdaq
transaction services Brian Hyndman, who noted that exchanges have dealt with massive increases
in message traﬃc over the past ﬁve to six years, coinciding with algorithmic growth.
“It used to be one-to-one,” Hyndman said. “Then you’d see a customer send ten orders
5See, for example, Jonathan Keehner, “Massive surge in quotes, electronic messages may paralyse US market,”
http://www.livemint.com/2007/06/14005055/Massive-surge-in-quotes-elect.html, June 14, 2007.
5that would result in only one execution. That’s because the black box would cancel a
lot of the orders. We’ve seen that rise from 20- to 30- to 50-to-one. The amount of
orders in the marketplace increased exponentially.”6
In the case of the NYSE, electronic message traﬃc includes order submissions, cancella-
tions, and trade reports that are handled by the NYSE’s SuperDOT system and captured in the
NYSE’s System Order Data (SOD) database. The electronic message traﬃc measure for the NYSE
excludes all specialist quoting, as well as all orders that are sent manually to the ﬂoor and are
handled by a ﬂoor broker.
[insert Figure 1]
As suggested by the quote above, an important issue is whether and how to normalize the
message traﬃc numbers. The top half of Figure 1 shows the evolution of message traﬃc over time.
We focus on the largest-cap quintile of stocks, as these constitute the vast bulk of stock market
capitalization and trading activity. Immediately after decimalization at the start of 2001, the
average large-cap stock sees about 35 messages per minute during the trading day. There are a few
bumps along the way, but by the end of 2005, there are an average of about 250 messages per minute
(more than 4 messages per second!) for these same large-cap stocks. We could, of course, simply
use the raw message traﬃc numbers, but there has been a marked increase in trading volume over
the same interval, and without normalization a raw message traﬃc measure may just be capturing
the increase in trading rather than the change in the nature of trading. Therefore, we normalize
by calculating for each stock each month the number of electronic messages per $1,000 of trading
volume. This normalized measure still rises rapidly over the ﬁve-year sample, while measures of
market liquidity such as proportional spreads have declined sharply but appear to asymptote near
the end of the sample (see, for example, the average quoted spreads in the top half of Figure 2),
which occurs as more and more stocks are quoted with the minimum spread of $0.01. Since we are
essentially regressing spreads on algorithmic trading measures, we want both measures to have this
same general shape over time. Thus, our preferred measure is just the negative reciprocal of the
messages per dollar traded. Speciﬁcally, algo tradit is calculated as the negative of trading volume
(in thousands of dollars) divided by the number of electronic messages. However, our results are
virtually the same when we normalize by the number of trades or use raw message traﬃc numbers.
The results are also the same when we use the number of cancellations rather than the number of
messages to construct the algorithmic trading measure.
The time-series evolution of algo tradit is displayed in the bottom half of Figure 1. For
the largest-cap quintile, there is about $7,000 of trading volume per electronic message at the
6See Shane Kite, “Reacting to market break, NYSE and Nasdaq act on capacity,” Securities Industry News,M a r c h
12, 2007.
6beginning of the sample in 2001, decreasing dramatically to about $1,100 of trading volume per
electronic message by the end of 2005. Over time, smaller-cap stocks display similar time-series
patterns. Cross-sectionally, there is a positive monotonic relationship between market cap and
trading volume per message. In general, we focus more on time-series behavior rather than the
cross-sectional patterns.
It is worth noting that our algorithmic trading proxies may also capture changes in trading
strategies. For example, messages and algo tradit will increase if the same market participants use
algorithms but modify their trading or execution strategies so that those algorithms submit and
cancel orders more often. Similarly, the measure will increase if existing algorithms are modiﬁed
to “slice and dice” large orders into smaller pieces. This is useful, as we want to capture increases
in the intensity of order submissions and cancellations by existing algorithmic traders, as well as
the increase in the fraction of market participants employing algorithms in trading.
2.2 Summary statistics
[insert Table 1]
Table 1 contains means by quintile and within-stock standard deviations for all of the
variables used in the analysis. We measure liquidity using quoted half-spreads, eﬀective half-
spreads, 5-minute realized spreads, and 5-minute price impacts, all of which are measured as share-
weighted averages and expressed in basis points as a proportion of the prevailing midpoint. The
eﬀective spread is the diﬀerence between an estimate of the true value of the security (the midpoint
of the bid and ask) and the actual transaction price. For the tth trade in stock j, the proportional
eﬀective half-spread (espreadjt)i sd e ﬁ n e da s :
espreadjt = qjt(pjt − mjt)/mjt, (1)
where qjt is an indicator variable that equals +1 for buyer-initiated trades and −1 for seller-initiated
trades, pjt is the trade price, and mjt is the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the trade.
We follow the standard trade-signing approach of Lee and Ready (1991) and use contemporaneous
quotes to sign trades and calculate eﬀective spreads (see Bessembinder (2003), for example). For
each stock each day, we use all NYSE trades and quotes to calculate quoted and eﬀective spreads
for each reported transaction and calculate a share-weighted average across all trades that day. For
each month we calculate the simple average across days. We also measure quoted depth at the
time of each transaction and report share-weighted averages measured in thousands of dollars. For
example, the mean eﬀective half-spread of 3.67 basis points for stocks in the largest-cap quintile
corresponds to a half-spread of 1.68 cents (or a whole spread of 3.36 cents) on a stock with the
7mean share price of $45.90.
[insert Figure 2]
The ﬁgures show quite clearly that, over time, algorithmic trading is gradually increasing
while liquidity is gradually improving. Figure 1 shows that algorithmic trading increases almost
monotonically. The spread measures in Figure 2 are not nearly as monotonic, with illiquidity
spikes in both 2001 and 2002 that correspond to sharp stock market declines. Nevertheless, one is
tempted to conclude that these two trends are related. The analysis to come investigates exactly
this relationship using formal econometric tools rather than casual armchair empiricism.
2.3 Correlations
[insert Table 2]
We begin with Table 2, which uses our monthly panel to provide a set of univariate correlations
between spreads, algorithmic trading variables, volume, volatility, and share price variables. It is
interesting to note that the cross-sectional (between) correlation between spreads and algo tradit is
positive. This matches the cross-quintile evidence in Figure 1 and Figure 2. This is clearly driven
by the cross-section of volume because the correlation with raw message traﬃc is strongly negative.
Perhaps there is a ﬁxed component to message traﬃc, in that a certain amount of message traﬃc
is required for price discovery regardless of how much trading occurs, giving rise to the positive
cross-sectional correlation between spreads and algo tradit. While there is undoubtedly value to
further analyzing the causes and eﬀects of cross-sectional variability in algorithmic trading, we focus
hereafter on within-stock correlations, because we want to understand the impact of the change in
algorithmic trading over time.
The within-stock correlation between quoted spreads and algorithmic trading is negative
and signiﬁcant. This is a contemporaneous correlation, and we do not have anything yet to say
about causality. But it appears that, stock by stock in the panel, algorithmic trading is high when
spreads are narrow. We also ﬁnd that algorithmic trading is negatively correlated with volatility,
where volatility is measured as the standard deviation of daily midpoint returns for a given month.
2.4 Panel regressions
To conﬁrm that these univariate correlations are robust, we specify regressions for our monthly
panel that are of the form:
Lit = αi + γt + βAit + δXit +  it, (2)
8where Lit is a liquidity measure (quoted spread, eﬀective spread, or quoted depth) for stock i in
month t, Ait is the algorithmic trading measure algo tradit,a n dXit is a vector of control variables,
including trading volume, return volatility, inverse price, and log market cap. Firm ﬁxed eﬀects are
always included (αi); results are always reported with and without calendar ﬁxed eﬀects (γt). We
estimate separate regressions for each of the market-cap quintiles, and standard errors are robust
to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity and within-group autocorrelation (see
Arellano and Bond (1991)).
[insert Table 3]
The results are in Table 3 Panel A, and they are qualitatively consistent across the size
quintiles. The sign of the algorithmic trading coeﬃcient depends on whether time dummies are
included. When there are no calendar ﬁxed eﬀects, the regression is identiﬁed using only within-
stock variation. Here the results match the univariate within-stock correlations: the coeﬃcient
on algo tradit is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that an increase in algorithmic trading is
associated with narrower quoted or eﬀective spreads. When time dummies are added, changes
to common market-wide liquidity factors are removed, and the regression is identiﬁed using only
idiosyncratic changes in liquidity. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on algo tradit changes sign in this
case. This does not cast doubt on our other results; it implies only that algorithmic trading and
idiosyncratic liquidity are negatively related. However, it does suggest that the positive time-series
association within a given stock between liquidity and algorithmic trading is driven by changes in
market-wide common liquidity factors.
If spreads narrow when algorithmic trading increases, it is natural to decompose the spread
along the lines of Glosten (1987) to determine whether the narrower spread means less revenue for
liquidity providers, smaller gross losses to liquidity demanders, or both. We estimate revenue to
liquidity providers using the 5-minute realized spread. The proportional realized spread for the tth
transaction in stock j is deﬁned as:
rspreadjt = qjt(pjt − mj,t+5min)/mjt, (3)
where pjt is the trade price, qjt is the buy-sell indicator (+1 for buys, −1 for sells), mjt is the
midpoint prevailing at the time of the tth trade, and mj,t+5min is the quote midpoint ﬁve minutes
after the tth trade (the price at which the liquidity provider is assumed able to close her position).
We measure gross losses to liquidity demanders due to adverse selection using the 5-minute
price impact of a trade (adv selectionjt), deﬁned using the same variables as:
adv selectionjt = qjt(mj,t+5min − mjt)/mjt. (4)
9Note that there is an arithmetic identity relating the realized spread, the adverse selection
(price impact), and the eﬀective spread espreadjt:
espreadjt = rspreadjt + adv selectionjt. (5)
For these spread components, we estimate panel regressions of the same form as before,
and the results are in Panel B of Table 3. Again we report results with and without calendar ﬁxed
eﬀects, but we focus on the results without time dummies. Both realized spreads (espreadjt)a n d
price impacts (adv selectionjt) are negatively associated with algorithmic trading. More algorith-
mic trading is associated with narrower eﬀective spreads, and these narrower spreads imply lower
revenue per trade for the liquidity provider as well as smaller gross losses to liquidity demanders.
But the relative contributions of the two components are very diﬀerent. Most of the narrowed
spread is due to a decline in adverse selection losses to liquidity demanders. Depending on the
size quintile being studied, 75% to 90% of the narrowed spread is due to a smaller price impact.
We discuss this in considerable detail below, but we suspect that while manually submitted limit
orders are eventually picked oﬀ by informed traders, algorithms are better able to avoid some of
these informed traders by a so-called “cancel and replace” of the stale limit order.
So far, all we have identiﬁed are time-series associations between algorithmic trading
and liquidity. We cannot yet say anything about the direction of causality. It is certainly easier
to tell a story that goes in the standard direction. For example, algorithmic trading could be
providing competition in liquidity provision, thereby improving liquidity. But algorithmic trading
is an endogenous choice variable that depends on liquidity, among other parameters. Liquidity is
also endogenous and depends on a variety of factors, including the technological and other costs
incurred by liquidity providers. Sorting out causality requires an exogenous instrument, and the
next section introduces the IV analysis that lies at the heart of the paper.
3 Autoquote
As a result of the reduction of the minimum tick to a penny in early 2001 as part of decimalization,
the depth at the inside quote shrank dramatically. In October 2002, the NYSE proposed that a
“liquidity quote” for each stock be displayed along with the best bid and oﬀer. The NYSE liquidity
quote was designed to provide more information about expressed trading interest at prices outside
of the best bid and oﬀer (it was also designed to recapture some of the block trading business that
the NYSE had lost to upstairs markets and to algorithms). A liquidity quote was to be a ﬁrm bid
and oﬀer for substantial size, typically at least 15,000 shares, accessible immediately via a new type
10of market order called Institutional Xpress.7
At the time of the liquidity quote proposal, specialists were responsible for manually
disseminating the inside quote.8 Clerks at the specialist posts on the ﬂoor of the exchange were
typing rapidly and continuously from open to close and still were barely keeping up with order
matching, trade reporting, and quote updating. In order to ease this capacity constraint and
free up specialists and clerks to manage a liquidity quote, the exchange proposed to allow the
inside quote to be disseminated automatically. Under NYSE Rule 60, display book software would
“autoquote” the NYSE’s highest bid or lowest oﬀer whenever there was a change to the limit order
book via SuperDOT. This would happen when a better-priced order arrived, when the inside quote
was traded with in whole or in part, or when the size of the inside quote changed.
Note that the specialist’s structural advantages were otherwise unaﬀected by this change.
A specialist could still disseminate a manual quote at any time in order to reﬂect his own trading
interest or that of ﬂoor traders. Specialists continued to execute most trades manually, and they
could still participate in those trades subject to the unchanged NYSE rules. NYSE market share
remains unchanged at about 80% around the adoption of autoquote.
[insert Figure 5]
In early 2003, the liquidity quote proposal became enmeshed in a dispute over property
rights between the exchange and data vendors such as Bloomberg. The SEC eventually issued a
stay delaying the implementation of the liquidity quote, and the liquidity quote did not become
operational until June 13, 2003. Meanwhile, the NYSE began to phase in the liquidity quote and
autoquote software on January 29, 2003, starting with 6 active, large-cap stocks. During the next
two months, over 200 additional stocks were phased in at various dates, and all remaining NYSE
stocks were phased in on May 27, 2003. Figure 5 provides some additional details on the phase-in
process. The rollout order was determined in late 2002. Early stocks tended to be active large-
cap stocks, because the NYSE felt that these stocks would beneﬁt most from the liquidity quote.
Beyond that criterion, conversations with those involved at the NYSE indicate that early phase-
in stocks were chosen mainly because the specialist assigned to that stock was receptive to new
technology. The evidence supports this claim: other than size and trading activity, early phase-in
stocks are not signiﬁcantly correlated with any of the other observables.
Because liquidity quotes were not yet accessible or widely disseminated during this phase-
in period, the only change to market structure from January to May 2003 was the non-synchronous
addition of autoquote, making this an ideal exogenous event for study. In fact, even when liquidity
7For more details, the NYSE proposal is contained in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47091 (December 23,
2002), 68 FR 133.
8There was one main exception. If a new or cancelled SuperDOT limit order would change the inside quote, the
“Quote Assist” feature of NYSE DisplayBook software automatically disseminated an updated quote after 30 seconds
if the specialist had not already done so.
11quotes became ﬁrm in June 2003, they had little impact on trading. Only a handful of large
orders ever used the Institutional Xpress order type, mainly because the spread was typically quite
large relative to what could be negotiated in the upstairs market. Most of the information in the
liquidity quote was already available to traders and algorithms via NYSE’s Openbook product,
which provided periodic snapshots of the NYSE limit order book (see Boehmer, Saar, and Yu
(2005) for an analysis of the introduction of OpenBook). Ultimately, liquidity quotes were deemed
an unsuccessful innovation and were abandoned in July 2005. But the autoquote feature stayed in
place.
For algorithmic traders, autoquote was an important innovation, because it provided much
more immediate feedback about the potential terms of trade. Autoquote allowed algorithmic liq-
uidity suppliers to, say, quickly notice an abnormally wide inside quote and provide liquidity ac-
cordingly via a limit order. Algorithmic liquidity demanders could quickly access this quote via
a conventional market or marketable limit order or by using the NYSE Direct+ facility, which
provided automatic execution for limit orders of 1,099 shares or less against the exchange’s dissem-
inated quote.
3.1 Autoquote sample
To study the eﬀects of autoquote, we build a daily panel for NYSE common stocks. The sample
begins on December 2, 2002, which is approximately two months before the autoquote phase-in
begins, and it extends through July 31, 2003, about two months after the last batch of NYSE
stocks moves to the autoquote regime. For consistency, we start with the same share price ﬁlters
as before: stocks with an average share price of less than $5 or more than $1000 are removed. To
make our various autoquote analyses comparable, we use the same sample of stocks throughout
this section. The Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b) decomposition (discussed below in section 3.3.2) has
the most severe data requirements, so we retain all stocks that have at least 21 trades per day for
each day in the eight-month sample period. This leaves 1,082 stocks in the sample.
Stocks are then sorted into quintiles based on market capitalization. Quintile 1 refers to
large-cap stocks and quintile 5 corresponds to small-cap stocks. All variables used in the analysis
are 99.9% winsorized (that is, values smaller than the 0.05% quantile are set equal to that quantile,
and values larger than the 99.95% quantile are set equal to that quantile).
3.2 Autoquote results
[insert Table 4]
12Autoquote clearly leads to greater use of algorithms. Message traﬃc increases by about 50% in the
most active quintile of stocks as autoquote is phased in (see Figure 5); it is certainly hard to imagine
that autoquote would change the behavior of humans by anything close to this magnitude. The
daily within-stock orrelation between message traﬃc and the autoquote dummy reported in Table 4
is 0.08. Correlations are higher for large-cap stocks, consistent with the conventional wisdom that
algorithmic trading was more eﬀective at the time for active, liquid stocks. Table 4 also shows
that there is also a signiﬁcant positive correlation between the autoquote dummy and our preferred
measure of algorithmic trading algo tradit, which is the negative of dollar volume (in hundreds)
per electronic message. This plus the exogenous phase-in makes the introduction of autoquote an
ideal instrument for assessing the impact of algorithmic liquidity suppliers.9
Within-stock correlations in Table 4 also show that after the introduction of autoquote
turnover is higher, volatility is lower, and share prices are higher. However, we have no intention of
ascribing these results to autoquote. These results likely reﬂect the fact that the market rose during
the early part of 2003 for unrelated reasons, and they highlight the importance of the staggered
introduction of autoquote for cleanly identifying the eﬀect of the market structure change. By
including time dummies in the panel speciﬁcation, we can use non-autoquoted stocks as controls,
comparing phased-in autoquoted stocks to not-yet-autoquoted stocks. The time dummies also
absorb potential nonstationarity in the time series.10
Our principal goal is to understand the eﬀects of algorithmic liquidity supply on market
quality, and so we use the autoquote dummy as an instrument for algorithmic trading in a panel
regression framework. Our main instrumental variables speciﬁcation is a daily panel of 1,082 NYSE
stocks over the eight-month sample period spanning the staggered implementation of autoquote.
The dependent variable is one of ﬁve liquidity measures: the quoted (half) spread, the eﬀective
half-spread, the 5-minute realized spread, or the 5-minute price impact of a given trade, all of
which are share-volume weighted and measured in basis points, or the quoted depth in thousands
of dollars. We have ﬁxed eﬀects for each stock as well as time dummies, and we include share
turnover, volatility (measured as the standard deviation of daily midquote returns in percent), the
inverse of share price, and the log of market cap as control variables. Results are virtually identical
if we exclude these control variables. Based on anecdotal information that algorithmic trading
was relatively more important for active large-cap stocks during this time period, we estimate this
speciﬁcation separately for each market-cap quintile.
[insert Table 5]
9In the IV regression tables (Tables 5-7), we report F statistics that reject the null that the instruments do not
enter the ﬁrst stage regression. We are therefore not concerned about the “weak instruments problem,” also because
our F statistics range from 5.88 to 7.32 and Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995, p.446) mention that “F statistics close
to 1 should be cause for concern.”
10In the IV regression tables (Tables 5-7), we test for any remaining nonstationarity in the residuals through
Dickey-Fuller tests. We reject the null of nonstationarity in all cases.
13The results are reported in Panel A of Table 5, and the most reliable eﬀects are in
larger stocks. For large-cap stocks (quintiles 1 and 2), the autoquote instrument shows that an
increase in algorithmic liquidity supply narrows both the quoted and eﬀective spread. To interpret
the estimated coeﬃcient on the algorithmic trading variable, recall that the algorithmic trading
measure algo tradit is the negative of dollar volume per electronic message, measured in hundreds
of dollars, while the spread is measured in basis points. Thus, the IV estimate of -0.52 on the
algorithmic trading variable for quintile 1 means that an increase in algorithmic trading from the
whole-sample mean of $2,634 of volume per message implies that quoted spreads narrow by 0.52
basis points. Over the whole ﬁve-year sample interval, the average within-stock standard deviation
for algo tradit is 11.2 or $1,120, so a unit standard deviation change in our algorithmic trading
measure is associated with a 5.82 basis point change in proportional spreads.
In the spirit of an event study, we also estimate an analogous non-IV panel regression
with the autoquote dummy directly on the right-hand side. We do not report the complete results,
but quoted and eﬀective spreads are reliably narrower for the three largest quintiles. For quintile
1, quoted spreads are 0.50 basis points smaller (t = -9.18) after the autoquote introduction, and
eﬀective spreads are 0.17 basis points smaller (t = -4.33). Eﬀective spreads narrow even more for
quintiles 2 and 3 (0.21 and 0.23 basis points, respectively).
The IV estimate on algo tradit is statistically indistinguishable from zero for quintiles 3
through 5. This could be a statistical power issue. Figure 5 shows that most small-cap stocks were
phased-in at the very end, reducing the non-synchronicity needed for econometric identiﬁcation.
Perhaps as a result, the autoquote instrument is only weakly correlated with algorithmic trading in
these quintiles. Alternatively, it could be that algorithms are less commonly used in these smaller
stocks, in which case the introduction of autoquote might have little or no eﬀect on these stocks’
market quality.
Quoted depth also declines with autoquote. One might worry that the narrower quoted
spread simply reﬂects the smaller quoted quantity, casting doubt on whether liquidity actually
improves after autoquote is introduced. Here, a calibration exercise is useful. The results for
quintile 1 indicate that a one-unit increase in algorithmic trading reduces the quoted spread by
10% (the average quoted spread from Table 1 is 5.31 basis points). The same change reduces the
quoted depth by about 4%, based on an average quoted depth of about $92,000. A small liquidity
demander is unaﬀected by the depth reduction and is unambiguously better oﬀ with the narrower
spread. Consider now a larger liquidity demander who is aﬀected by the depth reduction. She
pays 10% less on 96% of her order, and as long as she pays less than a 240% wider spread on the
remaining 4% of her order, she is better oﬀ overall. Based on the $45.90 average share price for
this quintile, the average 5.31 basis point quoted spread translates to 2.4 cents. For these stocks, it
seems extremely unlikely that the last 4% of her trade executes at a spread of more than 8.3 cents.
Most likely this last 4% would execute one cent wider. This makes it quite clear that the depth
14reduction is small relative to the narrowing of the spread.
3.3 Decomposition of the spread improvement
As discussed earlier in the paper, narrower eﬀective spreads imply either less revenue per trade
for liquidity providers, smaller gross losses to liquidity demanders, or both. In Table 5 Panel B,
we decompose eﬀective spreads into a realized spread component and an adverse selection or price
impact component in order to understand the source or sources of the improvement in liquidity
under autoquote. IV regressions are repeated using each component of the spread.
The results are somewhat surprising. For quintiles 1 through 3 (large and medium-cap
stocks), the realized spread actually increases signiﬁcantly after autoquote, indicating that liquidity
providers are earning greater net revenues. These greater revenues are oﬀset by a larger decline
in price impacts, implying that liquidity providers are losing far less to liquidity demanders after
autoquote. As before, nothing is signiﬁcant for the two smallest-cap quintiles.
We describe these results as surprising because they do not match our priors going into the
analysis. We thought that if autoquote improved liquidity, it would be because algorithmic liquidity
suppliers were low-cost providers who suddenly became better able to compete with the specialist
and the ﬂoor under autoquote, and thereby improving overall liquidity by reducing aggregate
liquidity provider revenues. Instead, it appears that liquidity providers in aggregate were able to
capture some of the surplus created by autoquote.
[insert Table 6]
Which liquidity providers beneﬁt? We do not have any trade-by-trade data on the identity
of our liquidity providers, but we do know specialist participation rates for each stock each day, so we
can see whether autoquote changed the specialist’s liquidity provision market share. We conduct
an IV regression with the specialist participation rate on the left-hand side, and the results in
Table 6 conﬁrm that, at least for the large-cap quintile of stocks, specialists appear to participate
less under autoquote, suggesting that it is other liquidity providers who capture the surplus created
by autoquote.
Table 6 also puts a number of other non-spread variables on the LHS of the IV speciﬁcation.
The most interesting is trade size. At least for the two largest quintiles, the autoquote instrument
conﬁrms most observers’ strong suspicions that the increase in algorithmic trading is one of the
causes of smaller average trade sizes in recent years.
153.3.1 Lin-Sanger-Booth decomposition
The decomposition of the eﬀective spread introduced above has the advantage of being simple, but
it also has distinct disadvantages. In particular, it chooses an arbitrary time point in the future
(ﬁve minutes in this case) and implicitly ignores other trades that might have happened in that
ﬁve-minute time period. Lin, Sanger, and Booth (Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995)) develop a spread
decomposition model that is estimated trade by trade and accounts for order ﬂow persistence (the
empirical fact, ﬁrst noted by Hasbrouck and Ho (1987), that buyer-initiated trades tend to follow
buyer-initiated trades).11 Let
δ = Prob[qt+1 =1 |qt =1 ]=Prob[qt+1 = −1|qt = −1] (6)
be the probability of a continuation (a buy followed by a buy or a sell followed by a sell). Further
suppose that the change in the market-maker’s quote midpoint following a trade is given by:
mt+1 − mt = λtqt. (7)
The dollar eﬀective half-spread st = qt(pt − mt) and is assumed constant for simplicity. If there
is persistence in order ﬂow, the expected transaction price at time t + 1 does not equal mt+1 but
instead is:
Et(pt+1)=δ(mt + qt(λt + st)) + (1 − δ)(mt + qt(λt − st)
= mt + qt(λt +( 2 δ − 1)st). (8)
This expression shows how far prices are expected to permanently move against the market-maker.
While the market-maker earns st initially, in expectation he then loses λt +( 2 δ − 1)st due to
adverse selection and order persistence, respectively. Note that this reduces to Glosten (1987)
if δ = 0.5 so that order ﬂow is independent over time. We can identify the adverse selection
component λ by regressing midpoint changes on the buy-sell indicator, and we can identify the
order persistence parameter with a ﬁrst-order autoregression on qt. The remaining portion of the
eﬀective spread is revenue for the market maker, referred to by LSB as the ﬁxed component of
the spread. Thus, spreads are decomposed into three separate components: a ﬁxed component
associated with temporary price changes, an adverse selection component, and a component due
to order ﬂow persistence. The ﬁxed, temporary component continues to reﬂect the net revenues
11See Barclay and Hendershott (2004) for discussion of how the Lin, Sanger, and Booth spread decomposition
relates to other spread decomposition models.
16to liquidity suppliers after accounting for losses to (the now persistent) liquidity demanders. The
adverse selection component captures the immediate gross losses to the current liquidity demander,
while the order ﬂow persistence component captures the expected gross losses to those demanding
liquidity in the same direction in the near future. We estimate the model and calculate components
of the eﬀective spread for each sample stock each day.
[insert Figure 6]
For each of the market-cap quintiles, the three panels of Figure 6 show how the three LSB
spread components evolve over the whole 2001 to 2005 sample period. There are no consistent
trends in the ﬁxed component: around the implementation of autoquote, there is an increase for
the smallest quintile, but this increase does not extend to the other quintiles. In contrast, the
adverse selection component falls sharply during the implementation of autoquote in the ﬁrst half
of 2003. This is true across all ﬁve quintiles, and the change appears to be permanent. Beginning
in the second half of 2002 and continuing to the end of 2005, there is also a steady decline in the
order persistence component of the spread. This suggests less persistence, which could indicate
that over this period algorithms and human traders both become more adept at concealing their
order ﬂow patterns, perhaps by using mixed order submission strategies that sometimes demand
liquidity and sometimes supply it.
[insert Table 7]
As discussed above, we are fortunate and do not need to hang our hats on these time-series
declines. The staggered introduction of autoquote allows us to take out all market-wide eﬀects and
focus on cross-sectional diﬀerences between the stocks that implement autoquote early vs. the
stocks that implement autoquote later on. As we did for the simpler decomposition, we can put
any one of the LSB spread components on the LHS of our IV speciﬁcation to determine the sources
of the liquidity improvement when there is more algorithmic trading. The results are in Panel A
of Table 7 and are quite consistent with the earlier decomposition. For the largest two quintiles,
autoquote (and the resulting increases in algorithmic trading) are associated with an increase in
the ﬁxed component of the spread, and a decrease in the adverse selection component and the order
persistence component. The drop in the adverse selection component is economically quite large.
During the autoquote sample period, the within standard deviation in our algorithmic trading
variable is 4.54, so a one standard deviation increase in algorithmic trading during this sample
period leads to an estimated change in the adverse selection component equal to 4.54 ∗− 0.26, or
about a 1.2 basis point narrowing of the adverse selection component. This is quite substantial,
given that the adverse selection component for the biggest quintile is only about 2 basis points on
average out of an overall 3.62 basis point eﬀective half-spread. The coeﬃcients on the other two
17components are of similar magnitude, indicating similar economic importance. As in the earlier
decomposition, there are no signiﬁcant eﬀects for the smaller-cap quintiles.
3.3.2 Hasbrouck decomposition
While the Lin-Sanger-Booth model begins to consider persistence in order ﬂow, it implicitly limits
the form of that persistence to an AR(1) process. Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b) introduces a VAR-
based model that makes almost no structural assumptions about the nature of information or order
ﬂow, but instead infers the nature of information and trading from the observed sequence of prices
and orders. In this framework, all stock price moves end up assigned to one of two categories: they
are either associated or unassociated with a recent trade. Though the model does not make any
structural assumptions about the nature of information, we usually refer to price moves as private
information-based if they are associated with a recent trade. Price moves that are orthogonal to
recent trade arrivals are sometimes considered based on “public information” (examples of this
interpretation include Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) and Barclay and Hendershott (2003)).
To separate price moves into trade-related and trade-unrelated components, we construct
a VAR with two equations: the ﬁrst describes the trade-by-trade evolution of the quote midpoint,
while the second equation describes the persistence of order ﬂow. Continuing our earlier notation,
deﬁne qjt to be the buy-sell indicator for trade t in stock j (+1 for buys, - 1 for sells), and deﬁne
rjt to be the log return based on the quote midpoint of stock j from trade t − 1t ot r a d et.T h e
VAR picks up order ﬂow dependence out to 10 lags:
rt =
10 
i=1
αirt−i +
10 
i=0
βiqt−i +  rt, (9)
qt =
10 
i=1
γirt−i +
10 
i=1
φiqt−i +  qt, (10)
where the stock subscripts j are suppressed from here on. The VAR is inverted to get the VMA
representation:
yt =

rt
qt

= θ(L) t =

a(L) b(L)
c(L) d(L)

 rt
 qt

, (11)
where a(L),b(L),c(L), and d(L) are lag polynomial operators. The permanent eﬀect on price of
an innovation et is given by a(L) rt + b(L) qt , and because we include contemporaneous qt in the
return equation, cov( rt,  qt) = 0 and the variance of this random-walk component can be written
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ai)2σ2
r +(
∞ 
i=0
bi)2σ2
q, (12)
where the second term captures the component of price discovery that is related to trade, and
the ﬁrst term captures price changes that are unrelated to trading (sometimes referred to as public
information). As discussed in Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b), this method is robust to price discreteness,
lagged adjustment to information, and lagged adjustment to trades.
[insert Figure 7]
The VAR and the trade-related and non-trade-related standard deviations are estimated
for each stock each day. We calculate monthly averages for each quintile during the autoquote
sample period and graph these in Figure 7. The most striking feature of the graph is the decline in
the trade-related standard deviation, while the non-trade-related standard deviations do not change
much as autoquote is introduced. This indicates that under autoquote much more information is
being incorporated into prices without trade, consistent with the results in Boulatov and George
(2007) when informed traders compete via limit orders.
While these time-series eﬀects appear large, again we prefer to identify the eﬀect using the
staggered autoquote instrument. The IV panel regression is estimated ﬁrst with the daily trade-
related standard deviation as the dependent variable. We then repeat using the non-trade-related
standard deviation on the left-hand side. The panel regressions continue to include stock ﬁxed
eﬀects, calendar dummies, and the same set of control variables.
The results can be found in Panel B of Table 7, and at least for the two larges quintiles
they conﬁrm that the time-series graphs are not spurious. Consistent with other methodologies,
we do not ﬁnd consistently reliable eﬀects for the three smallest-cap quintiles.
When a large-cap stock adopts autoquote and experiences an exogenous increase in algo-
rithmic trading, there is much less trade-correlated price discovery, and much more price discovery
that is uncorrelated with trading. We discuss this further below, but it seems likely that algorithms
are responding quickly to order ﬂow information and price moves of this and other stocks, thereby
updating quotes to prevent them from becoming stale and being picked oﬀ.
Based on our estimates, algorithmic trading has an economically important eﬀect on the
nature of price discovery. During the autoquote sample period, the within standard deviation in
our algorithmic trading variable is 4.54, so a one standard deviation increase in algorithmic trading
during this sample period leads to an estimated change in trade-correlated price discovery equal
to 4.54 ∗− 0.22, or almost exactly a 1 basis point reduction in the standard deviation of trade-
correlated returns. Figure 7 shows that this is the same order of magnitude as the actual level of
trade-correlated standard deviations measured from trade to trade, so this is indeed a substantial
19change in how prices are updated to reﬂect new information over time.
4 Discussion and interpretation
To help make sense of our counter-intuitive results (particularly the realized spread or temporary
component results), we turn next to a very simple generalized Roll model that is a slight variation
on one developed in Hasbrouck (2007). Though the model is quite simple, it provides a useful
framework for thinking about algorithmic trading and delivers a number of empirical predictions,
all of which match our empirical results.
4.1 A generalized Roll model
The “game” has two periods, each with an i.i.d. innovation in the eﬃcient price:
mt = mt−1 + wt, (13)
where wt ∈{  ,− } , each with probability 0.5. The game features three stages:
- At t = 0, risk-neutral humans can submit a bid and ask quote and, given full competition,
the ﬁrst one arriving bids her reservation price.
- At t = 1, humans can buy the information w1 at cost c. If they buy the information, they
can submit a new limit order.
- At t = 2, two informed liquidity demanders arrive, one with a positive private value associated
with a trade, +θ, the other with a negative private value, -θ.
We assume that 2c>θ , i.e., the cost of “observing” information for humans is suﬃciently
high that they do not update their quotes. The technical assumption  >θensures that trade
occurs only if there is non-zero private information at t = 2, and that only one of the two arriving
liquidity demanders transacts in that case.
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There are four equally likely paths through the binomial tree: uu, ud, du,a n ddd,w h e r e
u represents a positive increment of   to the fundamental value and d is a negative increment. In
equilibrium, humans do not buy the w1 information and update the quote at t = 1, since they have
to quote so far away from the eﬃcient price to make up for c that neither liquidity demander will
transact at that quote (as 2c>θ ). Given that they do not acquire the w1 information, humans
protect themselves by setting the bid price equal to m0 − 2  and the ask price equal to m0 +2  .
One of the liquidity demanders trades at t = 2 if the path is either uu or dd; the quote providers
break even. If the path is ud or du, then there is no trade, because the liquidity demander’s private
value is too small relative to the spread.
Clearly, under these assumptions all price changes are associated with order ﬂow, and
there is no public information component.
4.1.1 The model with algorithmic trading
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Now we introduce an algorithm that can buy the w1 information at zero cost (c =0 ) .
The results at t = 0 remain unchanged. At t = 1, the algorithm optimally issues a new quote. To
illustrate the idea, suppose w1 > 0. The algorithm knows that it is the only liquidity provider in
possession of w1, and so it puts in a new bid equal to m0 −θ.I fw2 > 0 as well, then a transaction
21takes place at the original ask of m0 +2  .I f w2 < 0, then a liquidity demander will hit the
algorithm’s bid. This bid is below the eﬃcient price, so there will eventually be a reversal, and
there is a temporary component in prices. Contrariwise, if w1 < 0, the algorithm places a new ask
at m0 + θ, which is traded with if it turns out that w2 > 0.
In the presence of algorithmic trading, part of the change in the eﬃcient price is revealed
through a quote update without trade. Public information now accounts for a portion of price
discovery, and imputed revenue to liquidity suppliers is now positive. Thus, the model can explain
even the surprising empirical ﬁndings on realized spreads and trade-correlated price moves. The
model also delivers narrower quoted spreads and more frequent trades, both of which are also
observed in the data.
To deliver an increase in realized spread, it is important in the model that competition
between algorithms be less vigorous than the competition between humans. This seems plausible
in reality as well. As autoquote was implemented in 2003, the extant algorithms might have found
themselves with a distinct competitive advantage in trading in response to the increased information
ﬂow, given that new algorithms take considerable time to build and test.
What kind of information can algorithms eﬃciently observe? There are probably many
answers, but it is hard to tell, given the general opacity practiced by algorithm providers and users.
Nevertheless, we suspect that two kinds of information are of ﬁrst-order importance. First, we
think algorithms can easily take into account common factor price information and adjust trading
and quoting accordingly. For example, if there is upward shock to the S&P futures price, an
algorithmic liquidity supplier in IBM that currently represents the inside oﬀer may decide to cancel
its existing sell order before it is picked oﬀ by an index arbitrageur or another trade, replace the
sell order with a higher-priced ask. Shocks to other stocks in the same industry could cause similar
reactions from algorithms. Second, some algorithms are designed to sniﬀ out other algorithms
or otherwise identify order ﬂow and other information patterns in the data. For example, if an
algorithm identiﬁes a sequence of buys in the data and concludes that more buys are coming, an
algorithmic liquidity supplier might adjust its ask price upward. Information in newswires can even
be parsed electronically in order to adjust trading algorithms.12
4.2 Alternative explanations
Up to now, we have focused on the algorithmic trading channel, but it is important to consider
whether a more mechanical explanation might account for our autoquote results. What might we
expect if autoquote simply makes quotes less stale and has no other eﬀects? It turns out that if
this is the only eﬀect of autoquote, we would expect to see eﬀective spreads widen once autoquote
12See, “Ahead of the Tape-Algorithmic Trading,” Economist, June 23, 2007.
22is turned on.
To see this, let at and bt be the ask and bid prices at time t, and assume this quote is
disseminated by the specialist. Limit orders arrive or are cancelled, and at a later time t , at and
bt are the best ask and bid prices. Assume that at and bt are disseminated only after the adoption
of autoquote; otherwise, the econometrician identiﬁes at and bt as the ask and bid in eﬀect at time
t .
To simplify the exposition, assume that the ask side of the book changes (at  = at) while
the bid side of the book remains unchanged (bt = bt). Symmetric arguments apply for changes
to the bid side of the book alone, and the results also hold when both the bid and the ask change
between t and t .
There are two possibilities for the change in the inside ask. If the time t inside ask is
cancelled, then at >a t. If instead a new sell order arrives at time t  that would improve the
inside quote, then at <a t. Overall, if cancels are more common than improvements, then prior
to the adoption of autoquote the disseminated quoted spread is artiﬁcially narrow, and autoquote
should be associated with a widening of quoted spreads. However, we ﬁnd the reverse. Autoquote
is associated with a narrowing of the quoted spread, so we focus hereafter on the arrival of new
orders at time t  that improve the existing time t quote. Prior to autoquote, we continue to observe
the old, wider quote (at, bt)a tt i m et . Under autoquote, the new, narrower quote (at, bt)i s
disseminated at time t .
Let mt = 1/2(at + bt) be the midquote at time t . Under autoquote, we see the true
state of the order book, and if a trade at time t  occurs at price pt (at either the bid price bt or
the ask price at), assume that the eﬀective half-spread st = qt(pt - mt) is correctly measured.
In contrast, before the adoption of autoquote the observed midquote at time t  is mt = 1/2(at +
bt), which is stale. Because we focus on the arrival of a sell order that improves the ask, mt <m t,
which means that in the absence of autoquote the observed quote midpoint is biased upwards.
Deﬁne the measured eﬀective spread pre-autoquote as st,pre = qt(pt - mt).
Thus, the change in the measured eﬀective spread under autoquote is the diﬀerence st -
st,pre = qt (mt - mt)=qt (at - at)/2. The term in parentheses is positive, since the arriving
sell order improves the quote by lowering the ask price, so the eﬀective spread declines under
autoquote if and only if E(qt) < 0. But this cannot be the case as long as the demand for
immediacy is downward sloping in the price of immediacy. To say it another way, a better ask price
should on average draw in a marketable buy order, which implies E(qt) > 0. Thus, if autoquote is
simply displaying quotes that were previously undisseminated, the result should be a widening of
the eﬀective spread under autoquote.
Note that there is an implicit assumption in the above analysis that without autoquote,
the diﬀerence between the true midquote mt and the disseminated midquote mt does not aﬀect
23qt, the sign of the trade. The trade sign can indeed be aﬀected if the new ask price at is below the
disseminated midquote mt. In this case both the true ask and bid prices are below the disseminated
midquote, and with the right choice of parameter values eﬀective spreads could be mechanically
narrower under autoquote. However, this scenario seems unlikely to dominate. First, it is quite
likely that the specialist would disseminate an updated quote if an incoming limit order crosses
the midquote in this way, as the new quoted spread would be less than half as wide as the old
quoted spread. Second, if this scenario were empirically important, the resulting trade-signing
errors would bias downward the pre-autoquote estimates of the adverse selection component of the
spread, because future price changes would be less correlated with trade signs. In this scenario,
we would expect to see an increase in adverse selection with the elimination of stale quotes under
autoquote. This is the opposite of our ﬁndings in Tables 5 and 7.
To summarize, a mechanical increase in quote disseminations would almost surely work
against us, widening the eﬀective spread. Thus, the elimination of stale quotes is unlikely to be the
source of our results.
5 Conclusions
The declining costs of technology have led to its widespread adoption throughout ﬁnancial indus-
tries. The resulting technological change has revolutionized ﬁnancial markets and the way ﬁnancial
assets are traded. Many institutions now trade via algorithms, and we study whether algorithmic
trading at the NYSE improves liquidity. Using panel regressions over the ﬁve years following deci-
malization, we establish that time-series increases in algorithmic trading are associated with more
liquid markets. To establish causality we use the staggered introduction of a structural change
at the NYSE (autoquoting) as an exogenous instrument for algorithmic trading. We demonstrate
that increased algorithmic trading lowers adverse selection and decreases the amount of price dis-
covery that is correlated with trading. These results suggest that algorithmic trading lowers the
costs of trading and increases the informativeness of quotes and prices. Surprisingly, the revenues
to liquidity suppliers also increase with algorithmic trading. This is consistent with algorithmic
liquidity suppliers having market power as they introduce their algorithms.
We have not studied it here, but it seems likely that algorithmic trading can also improve
linkages between markets, generating positive spillover eﬀects in these other markets. For example,
when computer-driven trading is made easier, stock index futures and underlying share prices are
likely to track each other more closely. Similarly, liquidity and price eﬃciency in equity options
probably improves as the underlying share price becomes more informative.
One caveat is in order, however. Our overall sample period covers a period of generally
rising stock prices, and stock markets are fairly quiescent during the 2003 introduction of autoquote.
24While we do control for share price levels and volatility in our empirical work, it remains an open
question whether algorithmic trading and algorithmic liquidity supply are equally beneﬁcial in more
turbulent or declining markets. Like Nasdaq market makers refusing to answer their phones during
the 1987 stock market crash, algorithmic liquidity suppliers may simply turn oﬀ their machines
when markets spike downward. With access to the right data, 2007 and 2008 stock markets could
prove to be a useful laboratory for such an investigation.
Finally, our results have important implications for both regulators and designers of trad-
ing platforms. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation NMS
(SEC (2005)) is designed to increase competition among liquidity suppliers. Our results highlight
the importance of algorithmic liquidity suppliers and the beneﬁts of ensuring vigorous competition
between them. Of course, markets need not leave this problem to the regulator. Trading venues
can attract these algorithms by lowering development and implementation costs. For example,
exchanges and other trading platforms can calculate useful information and metrics to be fed into
algorithms, distributing them at low cost. A market can also allow algorithmic traders to co-locate
their servers in the market’s data center. Finally, oﬀering additional order types, such as pegged
orders, can lessen the infrastructure pressures that algorithms impose.
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.Table 2: Overall, Between, and Within Correlations
This table presents the overall, between, and within correlations for some variables in our sample, which
contains monthly observations from February 2001 through December 2005. For variable deﬁnitions, we refer
to Table 1.
messa−
gesit
algo
tradit
share
turnoverit
vola-
tilityit
1/priceit ln mar−
ket capit
qspreadit ρ(overall) -0.43* 0.10* -0.14* 0.54* 0.74* -0.57*
ρ(between) -0.51* 0.51* -0.09* 0.65* 0.83* -0.68*
ρ(within) -0.33* -0.23* -0.20* 0.48* 0.63* -0.59*
messagesit ρ(overall) -0.08* 0.13* -0.20* -0.24* 0.72*
ρ(between) -0.87* 0.08* -0.17* -0.32* 0.90*
ρ(within) 0.63* 0.19* -0.24* -0.13* 0.43*
algo tradit ρ(overall) -0.12* -0.12* 0.24* -0.52*
ρ(between) -0.11* 0.19* 0.36* -0.86*
ρ(within) -0.14* -0.28* 0.12* 0.02*
share turnoverit ρ(overall) 0.35* -0.07* -0.07*
ρ(between) 0.44* -0.03* -0.13*
ρ(within) 0.31* -0.12* 0.15*
volatilityit ρ(overall) 0.47* -0.29*
ρ(between) 0.72* -0.41*
ρ(within) 0.30* -0.33*
1/priceit ρ(overall) -0.44*
ρ(between) -0.45*
ρ(within) -0.66*
a: Based on the time means i.e. xi = 1
T
T
t=1 xi,t.
b: Based on the deviations from time means i.e. x∗
i,t = xi,t − xi.
*: Signiﬁcant at a 95% level.T
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.Table 4: Overall, Between, and Within Correlations Autoquote Analysis
This table presents the overall, between, and within correlations for the variables used in the autoquote
analysis. It is based on daily observations in the period when autoquote was phased in, i.e. December
2, 2002, through July 31, 2003. For variable deﬁnitions, we refer to Table 1. We exploit the exogenous
autoquote dummy (0 before the autoquote introduction, 1 after) to instrument for algo tradit in order to
identify causality from algo tradit to our liquidity measures. In the IV estimation, we exclude identiﬁcation
oﬀ of a time trend (by adding time dummies) and thus solely rely on the nonsynchronous introduction of
autoquote (see Figure 5). Before we report the IV estimation results in subsequent tables, this table reports
correlations between the instrument (auto quoteit) and the endogenous variable (algo tradit)a f t e rr e m o v i n g
the time trend.
messa−
gesit
algo
tradit
share
turnoverit
vola-
tilityit
1/priceit ln mar−
ket capit
Panel A: Overall, between, and within correlation after removing the time trend
auto quoteit ρ(overall) 0.15* -0.05* 0.02* 0.03* 0.02* 0.10*
ρ(between) 0.23* -0.16* 0.06 0.09* 0.04 0.18*
ρ(within) 0.08* 0.03* -0.01* 0.00 0.01* -0.01*
Panel B: Within correlation by quintile after removing the time trend
auto quoteit Q1 ρ(within) 0.15* 0.03* 0.01* -0.00 0.03* -0.03*
auto quoteit Q2 ρ(within) 0.03* 0.04* -0.01* 0.00 -0.02* 0.01*
auto quoteit Q3 ρ(within) 0.05* 0.03* 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.02*
auto quoteit Q4 ρ(within) 0.01* 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
auto quoteit Q5 ρ(within) -0.00 0.03* -0.02* 0.00 0.05* -0.04*
a: Based on the time means i.e. xi = 1
T
T
t=1 xi,t.
b: Based on the deviations from time means i.e. x∗
i,t = xi,t − xi.
*: Signiﬁcant at a 95% level.T
a
b
l
e
5
:
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
f
A
T
o
n
S
p
r
e
a
d
:
N
o
n
s
y
n
c
h
r
o
n
o
u
s
A
u
t
o
q
u
o
t
e
I
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
s
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
e
s
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
(
h
a
l
f
)
s
p
r
e
a
d
o
n
o
u
r
a
l
g
o
r
i
t
h
m
i
c
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
p
r
o
x
y
.
I
t
i
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
d
a
i
l
y
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
t
h
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
w
h
e
n
a
u
t
o
q
u
o
t
e
w
a
s
p
h
a
s
e
d
i
n
,
i
.
e
.
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
,
2
0
0
2
,
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
J
u
l
y
3
1
,
2
0
0
3
.
W
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
e
x
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
n
o
n
s
y
n
c
h
r
o
n
o
u
s
a
u
t
o
q
u
o
t
e
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
t
o
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
a
l
g
o
t
r
a
d
i
t
t
o
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
c
a
u
s
a
l
i
t
y
f
r
o
m
a
l
g
o
r
i
t
h
m
i
c
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
t
o
l
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
.
W
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
L
i
t
=
α
i
+
γ
t
+
β
A
i
t
+
δ
X
i
t
+
ε
i
t
w
h
e
r
e
L
i
t
i
s
a
s
p
r
e
a
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
f
o
r
s
t
o
c
k
i
o
n
d
a
y
t
,
A
i
t
i
s
t
h
e
a
l
g
o
r
i
t
h
m
i
c
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
a
l
g
o
t
r
a
d
i
t
,
a
n
d
X
i
t
i
s
a
v
e
c
t
o
r
o
f
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
s
h
a
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
,
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
,
1
/
p
r
i
c
e
,
a
n
d
l
o
g
m
a
r
k
e
t
c
a
p
.
W
e
a
l
w
a
y
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
ﬁ
x
e
d
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
T
h
e
s
e
t
o
f
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
w
e
u
s
e
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
s
o
f
a
l
l
e
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
e
x
c
e
p
t
t
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
a
l
g
o
t
r
a
d
i
t
w
i
t
h
a
u
t
o
q
u
o
t
e
i
t
.
W
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
b
y
q
u
i
n
t
i
l
e
a
n
d
r
e
p
o
r
t
t
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
r
o
b
u
s
t
t
o
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
-
s
e
r
i
e
s
h
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
a
n
d
w
i
t
h
i
n
-
g
r
o
u
p
a
u
t
o
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
(
s
e
e
A
r
e
l
l
a
n
o
a
n
d
B
o
n
d
(
1
9
9
1
)
)
.
C
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
o
n
a
l
g
o
t
r
a
d
i
t
C
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
s
o
n
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
5
s
h
a
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
i
t
v
o
l
a
−
t
i
l
i
t
y
i
t
1
/
p
r
i
c
e
i
t
l
n
m
k
t
c
a
p
i
t
t
i
m
e
d
u
m
-
m
i
e
s
D
F
t
e
s
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
b
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
q
u
o
t
e
d
s
p
r
e
a
d
,
q
u
o
t
e
d
d
e
p
t
h
,
a
n
d
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
p
r
e
a
d
q
s
p
r
e
a
d
i
t
-
0
.
5
2
*
*
-
0
.
4
2
*
*
-
0
.
4
3
-
0
.
1
6
9
.
9
2
-
2
.
8
0
*
*
0
.
9
0
*
*
1
0
8
.
3
0
*
*
-
3
.
5
5
*
*
Y
e
s
-
3
2
1
.
0
*
*
(
-
3
.
2
3
)
(
-
2
.
2
1
)
(
-
1
.
4
4
)
(
-
0
.
0
5
)
(
1
.
2
2
)
(
-
3
.
0
1
)
(
9
.
7
0
)
(
7
.
4
9
)
(
-
2
.
2
7
)
q
d
e
p
t
h
i
t
-
3
.
4
7
*
*
-
1
.
4
3
-
1
.
9
9
1
5
.
4
9
0
.
6
1
-
5
.
1
6
-
1
.
6
4
*
-
3
.
9
0
1
2
.
1
2
Y
e
s
-
3
0
0
.
3
*
*
(
-
2
.
5
0
)
(
-
1
.
1
6
)
(
-
1
.
0
7
)
(
0
.
3
9
)
(
0
.
1
9
)
(
-
0
.
6
4
)
(
-
1
.
8
7
)
(
-
0
.
0
3
)
(
0
.
8
3
)
e
s
p
r
e
a
d
i
t
-
0
.
1
8
*
*
-
0
.
3
2
*
*
-
0
.
3
5
-
1
.
6
3
4
.
6
5
-
1
.
0
1
*
*
0
.
6
9
*
*
7
2
.
7
2
*
*
-
1
.
2
7
Y
e
s
-
3
2
9
.
8
*
*
(
-
2
.
6
5
)
(
-
2
.
2
3
)
(
-
1
.
5
6
)
(
-
0
.
4
2
)
(
1
.
1
6
)
(
-
2
.
3
2
)
(
9
.
5
1
)
(
1
0
.
9
1
)
(
-
1
.
4
5
)
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
s
p
r
e
a
d
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
r
s
p
r
e
a
d
i
t
0
.
3
5
*
*
0
.
7
6
*
*
1
.
0
3
*
*
1
4
.
2
6
1
5
.
8
8
3
.
1
3
*
-
1
.
0
6
*
*
4
5
.
8
1
*
*
5
.
0
6
Y
e
s
-
3
0
3
.
6
*
*
(
3
.
5
3
)
(
3
.
9
7
)
(
2
.
0
6
)
(
0
.
4
6
)
(
1
.
3
6
)
(
1
.
9
2
)
(
-
2
.
1
5
)
(
4
.
1
4
)
(
1
.
1
8
)
a
d
v
s
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
i
t
-
0
.
5
3
*
*
-
1
.
0
7
*
*
-
1
.
3
9
*
*
-
1
5
.
4
8
-
1
1
.
2
1
-
4
.
1
2
*
*
1
.
7
5
*
*
2
6
.
6
1
*
-
6
.
2
7
Y
e
s
-
2
9
8
.
3
*
*
(
-
3
.
5
7
)
(
-
4
.
0
8
)
(
-
2
.
0
6
)
(
-
0
.
4
7
)
(
-
1
.
3
3
)
(
-
2
.
2
4
)
(
3
.
2
9
)
(
1
.
8
4
)
(
-
1
.
3
4
)
#
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
:
1
0
8
2
*
1
6
7
(
s
t
o
c
k
*
d
a
y
)
F
t
e
s
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
o
f
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
t
h
a
t
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
d
o
n
o
t
e
n
t
e
r
ﬁ
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
:
7
.
3
2
(
F
(
5
,
1
7
9
5
8
7
)
)
,
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
:
0
.
0
0
0
0
*
/
*
*
:
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
t
a
9
5
%
/
9
9
%
l
e
v
e
l
.
a
:
W
e
u
s
e
q
u
i
n
t
i
l
e
-
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
c
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
F
o
r
b
r
e
v
i
t
y
,
w
e
o
n
l
y
r
e
p
o
r
t
t
h
e
(
a
c
r
o
s
s
t
h
e
q
u
i
n
t
i
l
e
s
)
m
a
r
k
e
t
-
c
a
p
-
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
c
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
f
o
r
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
i
t
s
t
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
.
b
:
W
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
t
h
e
D
i
c
k
e
y
-
F
u
l
l
e
r
t
e
s
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
i
n
o
r
d
e
r
t
o
d
i
a
g
n
o
s
e
n
o
n
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
a
r
i
t
y
.
A
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
t
e
s
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
r
e
j
e
c
t
s
t
h
e
n
u
l
l
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
s
e
r
i
e
s
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
a
u
n
i
t
r
o
o
t
,
i
.
e
.
i
t
r
e
j
e
c
t
s
n
o
n
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
a
r
i
t
y
.Table 6: Eﬀect of AT on Nonspread Variables: Nonsynchronous Autoquote
Introduction as Instrumental Variable
This table regresses nonspread variables on our algorithmic trading proxy. It is based on daily observations
in the period when autoquote was phased in, i.e. December 2, 2002, through July 31, 2003. We use the
exogenous nonsynchronous autoquote introduction to instrument for the endogenous algo tradit to identify
causality from algorithmic trading to these nonspread variables. We estimate
Mit = αi + γt + βAit + εit
where Mit is a nonspread variable for stock i on day t,a n dAit is the algorithmic trading measure. We always
include ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies. We regress by quintile and report t-values based on standard errors
that are robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity and within-group autocorrelation
(see Arellano and Bond (1991)).
Coeﬃcient on algo tradit
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
time
dum-
mies
DF test
statistica
share turnoverit 0.04 -0.07* 0.01 -0.20 -0.36** Yes -272.3**
(1.03) (-1.77) (0.07) (-0.26) (-2.89)
tradesit 0.58** -0.01 -0.01 -0.51 -0.15** Yes -245.7**
(2.60) (-0.23) (-0.15) (-0.33) (-2.60)
trade sizeit -2.04** -0.80** -0.33 2.26 -0.22 Yes -261.6**
(-4.63) (-3.23) (-0.69) (0.20) (-0.60)
specialist participit -0.59** -0.23 -0.92 -13.19 -1.89** Yes -259.4**
(-2.22) (-1.24) (-1.43) (-0.29) (-2.02)
#observations: 1082*167 (stock*day)
F test statistic of hypothesis that instruments do not enter ﬁrst stage regression: 5.88
(F(5,179607)), p-value: 0.0000
*/**: Signiﬁcant at a 95%/99% level.
a: We report the Dickey-Fuller test statistic based on the residuals in order to diagnose nonstationarity. A
signiﬁcant test statistic rejects the null that the series contains a unit root, i.e. it rejects nonstationarity.T
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Figure 1: These graphs depict (i) the number of (electronic) messages per minute and (ii)
our proxy for algorithmic trading, which is deﬁned as the negative of trading volume (in
thousands of dollars) divided by the number of messages. The graphs are done by market-
cap quintile, where Q1 is the large-cap quintile.2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
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Figure 2: These graphs depict (i) quoted half spread, (ii) quoted depth, and (iii) eﬀective
spread. All spread measures are share-volume weighted averages. The graphs are done by
market-cap quintile, where Q1 is the large-cap quintile.2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
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Figure 3: These graphs depict the two components of the eﬀective spread: (i) realized spread
and (ii) the adverse selection component, i.e. the (permanend) price impact. The spread
decomposition is based on the 5 minute delayed spread midpoint. The graphs are done by
market-cap quintile, where Q1 is the large-cap quintile.2
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Figure 5: This graph depicts the staggered introduction of autoquote on the NYSE. It
graphs the number of stocks in each market-cap quintile that are autoquoted at a given
time. Quintile 1 contains large-cap stocks.2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
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Figure 6: These graphs depict the three components of a Lin-Sanger-Booth spread decom-
position, which accounts for order persistence. It identiﬁes a ﬁxed (transitory) component
(LSB95 fixedit), an adverse selection component (LSB95 adv selit), and a component due
to order persistence (LSB95 order persistit) (see Section 3.3.1 and Lin, Sanger, and Booth
(1995) for details). The graphs are done by market-cap quintile, where Q1 is the large-cap
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Figure 7: These graphs depict a VAR-based Hasbrouck decomposition of the permanent
price change in between transactions into a trade-related (stdev tradecorr compit) and trade-
unrelated (stdev nontradecorr compit) component (see Section 3.3.2 and Hasbrouck (1991a,
1991b) for details). The graph depicts the autoquote sample period which runs from De-
cember 2002 through July 2003. The graphs are done by market-cap quintile, where Q1 is
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